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I. INTRODUCTION
You cannot avoid them. They are everywhere: attorney
advertisements. You see them on television, billboards, buses,
benches, magazines, newspapers, and even urinals in bars.1 If you go
online, you arguably see them even more with a dizzying array of
marketing, branding, and other promotions. Many also engage in
crazy and zany videos. 2 They show wreck videos, play Christmas
jingles, employ talking dolls, resemble soap operas, or depict lawyers
as superheroes.3 Some attorneys use sexually provocative ads. 4 Some
certainly can push the boundaries of good taste. 5 The nicknames some
of these lawyers inspire interest or at least laughter. To name a few,

1. Stacy Barchenger, Lawyer Banks on “DUI Dick” Name to Find Clients,
THE TENNESSEAN, https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2014/12/30/lawyerbanks-dui-dick-name-find-clients/21062843/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2015, 8:18 PM)
(describing a now-deceased attorney, V. Michael Fox, who had his ads placed above
urinals in various bars in Middle Tennessee). Several years earlier, a state lawmaker
introduced a bill in the Tennessee legislature to limit DUI lawyer ads. See Erik
Schelzig, Senate Measure Would Ban Lawyers from DUI Advertising, MEMPHIS
DAILY
NEWS
(Apr.
24,
2008),
https://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2008/apr/24/senate-measure-would-banlawyers-from-dui-advertising/.
2. See, e.g., Kylie Madry, Fort Worth’s “Texas Law Hawk” Blows Up the
Internet in Firework-Fueled Commercial, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (July 6, 2017),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/fort-worth/2017/07/06/fort-worths-texas-lawhawk-blows-internet-firework-fueled-commercial (describing a lawyer commercial
in which the lawyer set off fireworks that he had tied to himself).
3. Supreme Court Won’t Restrain Lawyer Ads, MOBILE PRESS-REGISTER,
Mar. 3, 2009, at B3; Joseph Goldstein, Superhero Lawyer Ads Are Ruled Fit for TV,
N.Y. SUN (July 24, 2007), https://www.nysun.com/new-york/superhero-lawyer-adsare-ruled-fit-for-tv/58989/.
4. See generally Steven A. Delchin & Sean P. Costello, Show Me Your
Wares: The Use of Sexually Provocative Ads to Attract Clients, 30 SETON HALL L.
REV. 64 (1999) (analyzing the ethics of lawyers’ uses of sexually themed
advertisements to attract clients).
5. Anna Massoglia, Lawyer Videos That Push the Boundaries of Dignity and
Good Taste, LAWYERIST.COM (Nov. 25, 2016), https://lawyerist.com/attorney-adsthat-pushed-the-bar/.
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there are “the Alabama Hammer,”6 “the Texas Law Hawk,”7 and “DUI
Dick.”8
It is not about laughs but serious dollars. Some lawyers
contribute literally millions of dollars to increase their brand through
phone numbers, domain names, and other venues. 9 For example, an
enterprising California-based attorney has spent millions marketing his
brand “No Cuffs.”10 A New Orleans-based attorney spends $1 million
per month in television advertising. 11 In 2015, personal injury
attorneys spent more than $892 million. 12 A year later, the total was
close to $1 billion.13 Attorney advertising has become more than
ubiquitous in modern America.
This Essay addresses the phenomenon of attorney advertising
from several vantage points. Part II of the Essay addresses how bestselling author John Grisham depicts attorney advertising in his great
book The Litigators. Part III discusses the legal framework of how the
U.S. Supreme Court protected attorney advertising as a form of
protected commercial speech. Part IV addresses how the states and
bar regulators have treated attorney advertising. Finally, Part V
addresses the recent Association of Professional Responsibility
Lawyers Report and the American Bar Association’s proposed

6. MIKE SLOCUMB LAW FIRM, http://www.slocumblaw.com/alabamahammer-741 (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
7. LAW HAWK : BRYAN E. WILSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW,
http://texaslawhawk.com/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
8. Barchenger, supra note 1.
9. Daniel Fisher, Lawyers Bump Advertising Spending to $890 Million in
Quest for Clients, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2015, 8:21 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/10/27/lawyers-bump-advertisingspending-to-890-million-in-quest-for-clients/.
10. David L. Hudson, Jr., NoCuffs, Big Bills: Firm Spends Millions on
Marketing,
AM.
B.
ASS’N
J.,
Jan.
2015,
at
33,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/nocuffs_big_bills.
11. Victor Li, Legal Advertising Blows Past $1 Billion and Goes Viral, AM.
B.
ASS’N
J.,
Apr.
2017,
at
35–36,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/legal_advertising_viral_video.
12. Sick of Lawsuits, Personal Injury Lawyers Spend More in Advertisements
than Super Bowl Advertisers, SOUTHEAST TEX. REC. (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:56 PM),
https://setexasrecord.com/stories/510663103-personal-injury-lawyers-spend-morein-advertisements-than-super-bowl-advertisers.
13. Li, supra note 11, at 36.
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changes to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct regarding
attorney advertising. Part V briefly concludes.
II. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING IN THE LITIGATORS
In The Litigators, the great John Grisham depicts a small law
firm, Finley & Figg, that flouts the rules of professional conduct
regarding attorney advertising to expand its business. Finley & Figg
engaged in a variety of solicitous schemes, a few ethical and many
others not so much.
For example, Wallis (“Wally”) Figg impersonated a doctor and
engaged in the most direct form of face-to-face solicitation, “hovering
over” a patient in her hospital bed.14 For this form of “blatant
solicitation,” he received a reprimand from the state bar association. 15
Undeterred, Wally would send flowers and letters to widows. 16 He
drove by funeral homes looking for clients. 17 He and his senior
partner, Oscar Finley (“Finley”), literally scrambled over other lawyers
to sign up accident victims in the street. 18 Finley stopped by a police
station where his cousin shuffled accident reports.19
Finley & Figg were “ambulance chasers” in the truest sense of
the term. 20 They even named their dog “AC” after the term. 21 Wally
particularly enjoyed the hustle and bustle of advertising, though
perhaps because of age they eschewed online advertising. As the
irascible office manager Rochelle said, “He advertised so much, in so
many ways, and in so many odd places that it was impossible to keep
up with him.”22 He advertised on park benches, high school football

14. JOHN GRISHAM, THE LITIGATORS 4 (2011).
15. Id. at 75.
16. Id. at 29.
17. Id. at 40–41.
18. Id. at 57.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Ambulance chasing is a long-used term in the legal profession that refers
to attorneys who violate anti-solicitation rules to obtain clients. Usually, the term
applies to aggressive personal injury plaintiffs’ attorneys who violate anti-solicitation
rules. See Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 225 P.2d 508, 519–20 (Cal. 1950)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (describing problems of ambulance chasing).
21. GRISHAM, supra note 14, at 56.
22. Id. at 45.
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programs, telephone poles, bingo cards, church bulletins, Rotary Club
raffles, coupons, and elsewhere. 23 The firm even advertised on the side
of buses. 24 Indeed, that was how the unsuspecting big-firm burnout
David Zinc (“Zinc”) discovered his future colleagues. 25 As he
branched into products liability law, Wally left “Beware of Krayoxx!”
brochures in restaurant bathrooms. 26
Wally could never convince Finley to go all-in on advertising.
Wally wanted to advertise via television and billboards, even picking
out the perfect location, but the less audacious Finley refused. 27
Grisham writes that “a siren from an ambulance always
quickened [Wally’s] pulse.”28 He describes the “murky world of client
solicitation.”29 Wally even admitted that he often engaged in “false
advertising.”30 A key example was Wally introducing the new, young
Zinc as a “mass tort specialist” when the young attorney had never
handled a products liability case. 31
Zinc had no illusions that his new bosses were the most ethical
sort. He admitted to his wife that “I doubt if they spend much time
discussing ethics.”32 Zinc, however, realized that Finley & Figg served
a higher purpose: they helped real people with real legal problems. 33
He told his frustrated father, a distinguished jurist: “That’s the beauty
of street law—you meet the clients face-to-face, you get to know them,
and, if things work out, you get to help them.” 34
Once he successfully prevailed in a products liability case, Zinc
had the leverage to force the firm to change names—Finley, Figgs &
Zinc—and eliminate its advertisements on bus benches, bingo cards,
and billboards.35 A “Marketing Committee” consisting of only Zinc
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 2–3, 45.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id. at 380–81.
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wielded veto power over any proposed firm advertisements. 36 Wally
and Finley, however, were burnt out on the practice of law; thus, Zinc
left the firm after only a year to form his own firm. 37
Many may think that Grisham exaggerated the conduct of the
fictitious Finley & Figg. Sadly, lawyers have engaged in similar
conduct. For example, an attorney in Ohio entered the hospital rooms
of a young woman lain up in traction and tried to sign her up as a
client. 38 Another attorney in Kansas obtained a list of people thinking
of selling their home, mailed them all letters, and offered his services
as an attorney.39 A New Jersey attorney instructed his office manager
and runner to contact accident victims on the day of their accident to
try to procure their business.40 Another New Jersey lawyer sent a
solicitation letter to the father of an airplane crash victim. 41 One
attorney earned the moniker “the Master of Disaster” because he
frequented disaster sites around the world to sign up clients. 42
Some of these egregious actions are quite recent. In late 2016,
a Texas-based law firm allegedly solicited family members of children
injured in a bus crash in Chattanooga, Tennessee. 43 One of the firm’s
investigators went to a funeral home only four days after the crash. 44
In December 2017, the Tennessee Attorney General filed a lawsuit
against the firm. 45 Similarly, a lawyer in Florida received 18 months’

36. Id. at 381.
37. Id. at 384–85.
38. Ohrahlik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 450 (1978).
39. State v. Moses, 642 P.2d 1004, 1005 (Kan. 1982).
40. In Re Pajerrowski, 721 A.2d 992, 992–94 (N.J. 1998).
41. In Re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1267 (N.J. 1992).
42. Maura Dolan, Fresh on the Heels of Trouble: Ambulance Chasing
Lawyers Are Getting More Aggressive. Some Pay Tipsters or Use Telemarketing. One
Attorney, the “Master of Disaster,” Flies Around the World to Catasrophes, L.A.
TIMES
(Oct.
13,
1993),
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-10-13/news/mn45319_1_ambulance-chasing-lawyers/2.
43. Attorney General Files Lawsuit Against Predatory Law Firm Targeting
Grieving Families, CHATTANOOGAN (Apr. 26, 2017) [hereinafter Attorney General
Files Lawsuit], http://www.chattanoogan.com/2017/4/26/346921/Attorney-GeneralFiles-Lawsuit-Against.aspx.
44. Zack Peterson, Cashing in on Grief, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
(Dec.
18,
2016),
http://www.pressreader.com/usa/chattanooga-times-freepress/20161218/281479276061261.
45. Attorney General Files Lawsuit, supra note 43.
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probation and 150 hours of community service for improperly
contacting an accident victim, which is a third-degree felony under a
Florida statute.46
Many lawyers have moved to cyberspace with aggressive
advertising. “Ambulance chasing is now taking place in cyberspace,”
writes Bob Buckley. 47 “Hungry lawyers . . . are now using the Internet
to hustle cases.”48 Others have engaged in the seedy world of
“competitive keyword advertising.”49 Under this process, lawyers
purchase keyword ads to ensure that their names or firm names pop up
first when consumers type in certain words. 50 In competitive keyword
advertising, lawyers will buy the name of another lawyer or law firm
as a keyword, and online searches for the competitor’s name will direct
Internet users to the purchaser’s domain instead.51
Many practitioners still view lawyer advertising as a cesspool
of hyperbolic, self-laudatory, and potentially misleading puffery. 52
Others claim that some attorney ads, particularly those seeking
prospective clients in suits against drug manufacturers, may even be
harmful.53 One commentator says that they “invoke fear and emotional
paralysis in some patients.”54 Grisham appears to support this point of
46. Gary Blankenship, Unlawful Solicitation Is Taken Very Seriously: Board
Panel Is Considering Even Stronger Methods of Enforcement, FLA. B. NEWS, May 1,
2016, at 1.
47. Bob Buckley, Lawyers Hustling Work Online a New Low, THE EXAMINER,
Dec. 7, 2011, at B7.
48. Id.
49. See generally Eric Goldman & Angel Reyes III, Regulation of Lawyers’
Use of Competitive Keyword Advertising, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 103 (2016).
50. David L. Hudson, Jr., Texas Lawyers May Use Competitors’ Names in
Keyword
Marketing,
AM.
B.
ASS’N
J.
(Nov.
2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/search_engine_marketing_legal_ethics
.
51. Id.
52. Ralph H. Brock, “This Court Took a Wrong Turn with Bates”: Why the
Supreme Court Should Revisit Lawyer Advertising, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 145, 198
(2009); M.H. Gertler, Lawyer Advertising Point: Enough Is Enough, 64 LA. BAR J.
110, 110–13 (2016).
53. Daniel M. Schaffzin, Warning: Lawyer Advertising May Be Hazardous to
Your Health! A Call to Fairly Balance Solicitation of Clients in Pharmaceutical
Litigation, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 319, 325 (2013).
54. Melissa Landry, Often Misleading and Sometimes Dangerous, Lawyer Ads
Should be Regulated, THE DONALDSONVILLE CHIEF, Mar. 2, 2017, at A4.
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view in The Litigators, using Figg & Finley as a caricature of the
lawyers who are ambulance chasers. This view has some merit. It is
undeniable that some lawyers cross the line with their excessive
solicitations and distasteful ads. Attorney advertisers, however, have
a valuable ally on their side: the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Attorney advertising also serves a purpose of the highest
order: informing consumers of their legal rights.
III. SUPREME COURT’S DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE AND PROTECTION FOR ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
The United States Supreme Court has recognized both the need
to regulate attorney advertising and its role in helping consumers learn
about legal assistance. 55 Originally, commercial speech received no
free-speech protection at all. In 1942, for example, the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the free-speech claims of an industrious entrepreneur
named F.J. Chrestensen who sought to advertise his World War I
submarine through handbills he distributed on New York City streets.
City officials informed Chrestensen that his activities violated the
Sanitary Code, which prohibited commercial handbills. 56 The
resourceful Chrestensen then printed double-sided handbills, detailing
his dispute with city officials on one side and his commercial speech
on the other side. 57
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Chrestensen’s attempts at
injecting political speech into his leaflets, declaring “[w]e are equally
clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising.” 58 The Court “plucked the
commercial speech doctrine out of thin air.”59 If the Supreme Court
granted First Amendment protection to any form of advertisement,
such as the famous editorial advertising “Heed Their Rising Voices”

55. See generally Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
56. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942) (referencing N.Y.C.
Sanitary Code § 318).
57. Id. at 52–53.
58. Id. at 54.
59. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REV. 627, 627 (1990).
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in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court justified it by stating that
the ad did more than propose a commercial transaction. 60
In the mid-1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection. The
seminal case was Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.61 The case examined a Virginia law
prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices;
Virginia asserted that allowing such advertisements would demean the
professionalism of the pharmacy profession. 62 In striking down the
statute as a violation of the First Amendment, Justice Harry Blackmun,
writing for the majority, stressed the importance of the information to
consumers: “When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do,
information as to who is charging what becomes more than a
convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the
enjoyment of basic necessities.”63
Justice Blackmun also emphasized society’s strong interest in
the “free flow of commercial information”64 and that such a free flow
was “indispensable” in a market economy based on private choices. 65
The high professional standards and regulations of the pharmacist
profession addressed the state’s concerns with professionalism. 66
Justice Blackmun then authored a time-honored passage in response to
the idea that the Commonwealth of Virginia was simply acting in the
best interests by protecting its citizens. He wrote:
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly
paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume that
this information is not in itself harmful, that people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well
60. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)
(“The publication here was not a ‘commercial’ advertisement in the sense in which
the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public
interest and concern.”).
61. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
62. Id. at 766.
63. Id. at 763–64.
64. Id. at 764.
65. Id. at 765.
66. Id. at 768.
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enough informed, and that the best means to that end is
to open the channels of communication rather than to
close them. If they are truly open, nothing prevents the
“professional” pharmacist from marketing his own
assertedly superior product, and contrasting it with that
of the low-cost, high-volume prescription drug retailer.
But the choice among these alternative approaches is not
ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly’s. It is
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if
it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for
us.67
According to Justice Blackmun, however, “some forms of commercial
speech regulation are surely permissible.”68
These included
regulations governing “[u]ntruthful,” “misleading,” and “deceptive”
commercial speech.69
A. Extending Commercial Speech Protection to Attorney
Advertising: Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
Virginia Pharmacy paved the way for the seminal lawyer
advertising decision, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.70 John R. Bates
and Van O’Steen graduated from Arizona State University College of
Law in 1972.71 They started working at Maricopa County Legal Aid
Society after graduation, providing various legal services to those who
could not afford legal services. 72 After two years, they left legal aid
and formed a small law firm, which they called a “legal clinic,” in
downtown Phoenix in 1974. 73 They soon realized they did not have
enough clients to keep the doors open.74 They turned to advertising
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
Party and
(2005).
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 770.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 771.
433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977).
Van O’Steen, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: The Personal Account of a
the Consumer Benefits of Lawyer Advertising, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 245, 246
Id.
Id.
Id.
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even though the state bar rules prohibited such advertising. 75 The
applicable rule provided:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or
associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements,
display advertisements in the city or telephone
directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor
shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his
behalf.76
Bates and O’Steen submitted the ad to The Arizona Republic,
advertising prices for routine legal services. 77 The State Bar of
Arizona served them with a complaint for violating the advertising
rule.78 The Committee of the State Bar recommended a six-month
suspension.79 The Board of Governors of the State Bar reduced the
suspension to one week. 80 Bates and O’Steen appealed to the Arizona
Supreme Court, which affirmed the punishment but reduced it to
censures. 81
The U.S. Supreme Court narrowly reversed on the First
Amendment issue by a 5-4 vote.82 The Court addressed numerous
arguments that the State advanced, including that advertising would
have an adverse impact on professionalism, 83 that attorney advertising
is inherently misleading,84 that it will have an adverse impact on the
administration of justice, 85 that it will have harmful economic

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 246–47.
Id. at 248 n.6.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
Id. at 368–72.
Id. at 372–75.
Id. at 375–77.
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impacts,86 that it will have an adverse impact on the quality of legal
services, 87 and that it will be too difficult to enforce.88
Regarding professionalism, Justice Blackmun questioned
whether advertising would cause the legal profession to look
undignified. 89 He noted that other professions, such as bankers and
engineers, advertise without a loss of dignity. 90 He also pointed out
that the ban against advertising arose as a “rule of etiquette,” not
ethics. 91
Justice Blackmun rejected the idea that attorney advertising is
inherently misleading. O’Steen and Bates simply advertised their
prices for such routine legal services as uncontested divorces, simple
adoptions, uncontested personal bankruptcies, and name changes. 92
Regarding adverse impacts, Justice Blackmun refuted the idea that
advertising would cause negative harms. “But advertising by attorneys
is not an unmitigated source of harm to the administration of justice,”
he wrote. 93 “It may offer great benefits.”94 Advertising would inform
the public about choices of counsel and the availability of legal
services, 95 particularly to the populace priced out of the legal market. 96
Justice Blackmun next addressed the argument that advertising
would drive up legal costs. He questioned this argument, noting that
the advertising ban “serves to perpetuate the market position of
established attorneys.”97 Advertising is helpful for new attorneys to
penetrate the market.98 With respect to quality of legal services, Justice
Blackmun wrote that advertising might actually help legal clinics, such
as that set up by Bates and O’Steen, to perform better legal work. 99

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 377–78.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 368–69.
Id. at 369–70.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id. at 376–77.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 378.
Id.
Id. at 378–79.
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Finally, Justice Blackmun did not think much of the argument
that it would be too difficult to enforce whether attorneys crossed the
line and engaged in false and misleading advertising. “For every
attorney who overreaches through advertising, there will be thousands
of others who will be candid and honest and straightforward.”100
Justice Blackmun concluded: “In sum, we are not persuaded that any
of the proffered justifications rise to the level of an acceptable reason
for the suppression of all advertising by attorneys.”101
The Bates decision “altered, in a profound way, the legal
profession and the legal services marketplace.” 102 The case “led to a
virtual explosion” in attorney advertising. 103 Judge William Canby,
who represented his former students successfully in Bates, told me
years ago: “The case stands for the idea that commercial information
is something that offers vitally important information to consumers
just as other types of speech, and the speech is important because it
leads to economic decisions that govern our lives. . . . Abraham
Lincoln advertised his services when he practiced law.”104
While the Court protected Bates’ and O’Steen’s ad, the Court
wrote that it might be a different story with regard to “in-person
solicitation.”105
B. Direct, Face-to-Face Solicitation Treated Differently
Recall that in Bates, the Supreme Court said that direct
solicitation might be treated much differently than the truthful
newspaper ad of John Bates and Van O’Steen.106 The Court addressed
that question the very next year in the case of Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Association.107 Cleveland-based attorney Albert Ohrahlik may

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 379.
Id.
O’Steen, supra note 71, at 245.
David L. Hudson, Jr., Bates Participants Reflect on Landmark Case,
NEWSEUM
INSTITUTE
(Nov.
18,
2004),
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2004/11/18/bates-participants-reflect-onlandmark-case/.
104. Id.
105. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
106. Id. at 366.
107. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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have been part of the inspiration for Grisham’s memorable character,
Wally Figg. Ohralik learned from the postmaster’s brother that two
young women were injured in an automobile accident. 108 He visited
one of the young women’s parents, who said that the decision of
whether to hire him as the attorney would be up to their daughter. 109
Ohralik then proceeded to the hospital where he saw 18-year-old Carol
McClintock lain up in traction in her hospital room. 110 She did not sign
an attorney retainer agreement that day but did two days later while
still in her hospital room. 111
Ohralik also visited the home of the other young woman in the
car, Wanda Holbert, and tried to sign her up as a client. 112 He secretly
tape-recorded the conversation with Ms. Holbert. 113 Ms. Holbert
orally agreed to let Ohralik represented her.114 The next day, Ms.
Holbert’s mother called Ohralik, saying she did not want to sue and
that her daughter was withdrawing the representation. 115 Ohralik said
that there was a binding contract. 116
Both young women discharged Ohralik as their attorney and
filed bar complaints against him. 117 The state disciplinary board
brought charges against Ohralik for improper solicitation and rejected
Ohralik’s First Amendment-based defense. 118 The Supreme Court of
Ohio adopted the Board’s findings but increased the punishment from
the recommended public reprimand to an indefinite suspension. 119
Ohralik appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
unanimously affirmed and ruled against the hospital-visiting
attorney.120 Ohralik argued that, just as Bates and O’Steen informed
potential clients about their legal rights, he did so as well with his in108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 450.
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 451–52.
Id. at 452.
Id.
Id. at 452–53.
Id. at 453–54.
Id. at 454.
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home and hospital visits.121 The Court rejected the analogy, reasoning
that in-person solicitation was not entitled to the same degree of respect
and protection as truthful advertising of routine legal services. 122 The
Court explained that “in-person solicitation may exert pressure and
often demands an immediate response, without providing an
opportunity for comparison or reflection.” 123
The Court also emphasized the roles of attorneys as “officers of
the courts”124—an appellation that Zinc accepted more readily than
Wally or Finley. 125 The Court stressed that protecting the public from
improper solicitation was a “legitimate and important state interest.” 126
Ohralik’s conduct was “inherently conducive to overreaching.” 127 The
Court concluded, “[t]he facts in this case present a striking example of
the potential for overreaching that is inherent in a lawyer’s in-person
solicitation of professional employment.” 128
C. High Court Pattern of Protecting Attorney Advertising
After Ohralik, the Court began consistently protecting attorney
advertisers in a series of cases. 129 On the same day the Court decided
Ohralik, the Court protected an ACLU attorney in South Carolina who
sought to obtain litigants to challenge an Aiken, South Carolina, policy
of conditioning the receipt of Medicaid benefits upon sterilization. 130
The Court distinguished the conduct of Edna Smith Primus, the ACLU
attorney, from Albert Ohralik because Primus was not engaged in “inperson solicitation for pecuniary gain.”131

121. Id. at 455.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 457.
124. Id. at 460 (citing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
125. See GRISHAM, supra note 14, at 380–81 (setting the ground rules for the
proposed Finley, Figg & Zinc firm).
126. Ohralik, 463 U.S. at 462.
127. Id. at 464.
128. Id. at 468.
129. See generally DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM
OF SPEECH § 6:4 (2013).
130. See generally In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
131. Id. at 422.
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The Court later struck down several Missouri restrictions on
attorney advertising in In Re R.M.J.,132 including a prohibition on
advertising oneself as a “real estate” lawyer, 133 a restriction prohibiting
an attorney from advertising that he was licensed in different states,134
and a prohibition on sending general announcement cards about an
attorney’s new solo practice. 135
In the next case, the Court ruled that the Ohio Bar Association
could not discipline an attorney for advertising that he was willing to
represent women injured by a contraceptive device. 136 In that decision,
the Court struck down a prohibition on illustrations in attorney ads. 137
The Court explained that the illustration of the contraceptive device
was not misleading. 138 The Court explained that a state could require
attorneys to include disclaimers in some ads to reduce the possibility
of potentially misleading speech. 139 The Court explained, “an
advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing
deception of consumers.”140
Then, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,141 the Court
struck down a general ban on attorney solicitation letters. The Court
explained “the First Amendment does not permit a ban on certain
speech merely because it is more efficient; the State may not
constitutionally ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only
to those whom it would most interest is somehow inherently
objectionable.”142 A few years later, the Court once again protected an

132. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
133. Id. at 205.
134. Id. at 205–06.
135. Id. at 206.
136. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 655–66 (1985).
137. Id. at 647–49.
138. Id. at 639–41.
139. Id. at 651 (quoting In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 201).
140. Id.
141. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
142. Id. at 473–74.
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attorney advertiser who advertised that he was a specialist certified by
the National Board of Trial Advocacy. 143
D. The Retrenchment
From In Primus through Peel, the Court consistently protected
attorney advertising from regulation. In 1995, however, the Court
sharply broke from this practice in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,144
narrowly upholding a Florida Bar rule prohibiting solicitation letters
until 30 days after an accident. Florida attorney G. Stewart McHenry
and his lawyer referral service, Went For It, Inc., challenged the 30day ban on solicitation letters as a direct infringement of First
Amendment free-speech rights.145 McHenry lost his law license for
acts of sexual misconduct.146 Went For It, Inc., however, continued as
a named plaintiff. 147 The Florida Bar countered that the rule was
necessary to protect the privacy rights of accident families and their
families and the reputation of the Bar.148 The Bar relied on a two-year,
106-page study that contained both anecdotal and statistical evidence
that many members of the public viewed attorney solicitations as
intrusive.149 The Court applied the test for evaluating restrictions on
commercial speech that it developed in the non-attorney advertising
decision Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n
of New York.150 Under the Central Hudson test, government officials
can freely regulate speech that is false or misleading. 151 If the speech
is truthful and non-misleading, however, the government must show
that it has a substantial interest in its regulation, that its regulation
143. Peel v. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm. of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 93,
110–11 (1990).
144. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
145. Id. at 621.
146. Fla. Bar v. McHenry, 605 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1992). McHenry allegedly
touched a personal-injury client all over her body during a client consultation. Id. at
460. He claimed it was to determine the extent of her injuries. Id. Allegedly, he then
went and masturbated at his desk. Id. Additionally, a second client complained that
McHenry masturbated while she was in his office. Id. at 460–61.
147. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 621.
148. Id. at 625.
149. Id. at 626.
150. Id. at 623–28 (citing 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
151. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
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directly and materially advances its substantial interest and is narrowly
tailored. 152
In Went For It, the Court assumed that the letters were neither
false nor misleading. 153 The Court then accepted the Bar’s stated
interests in privacy and the reputation of the Bar as substantial. 154
More controversially, the Court also found that the 30-day ban on
solicitation letters directly and materially advanced these interests in a
narrowly tailored way.155 The Court relied on the 106-page anecdotal
and statistical study, noting that it was “noteworthy for its breadth and
detail.”156 The study included letters from individuals, irate and upset
at receiving lawyer communications after the death of a loved one. 157
The idea that the 30-day rule directly and materially advanced
privacy and reputational interests in a narrowly tailored way was
problematic. In dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy criticized the
majority for reducing First Amendment protections for those most in
need of information about legal services. 158 Besides pointing out that
individuals in accidents often are in urgent need for legal assistance,
he reasoned that no such time limitation operated to restrict the
activities of insurance adjusters.159 Justice Kennedy explained, “direct
solicitation may serve vital purposes and promote the administration
of justice.”160 He wrote that the Florida Bar was “manipulating the
public’s opinion by suppressing speech that informs us how the legal
system works.”161
The great irony of the Court’s Went For It decision is that, at
about the same time that the Court decreased First Amendment

152. Id. at 565–66.
153. 515 U.S. at 624 (noting that government officials can regulate false or
misleading speech but proceeding to examine the remaining prongs of the Central
Hudson test, thus seemingly assuming the letters were neither false or misleading).
154. Id. at 625.
155. Id. at 626–28.
156. Id. at 627.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court today undercuts this
guarantee in an important class of cases and unsettles leading First Amendment
precedents, at the expense of those victims most in need of legal assistance.”).
159. Id. at 636.
160. Id. at 639.
161. Id. at 639–40.
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protection for attorney advertisers, the Court was strengthening
protection for other commercial advertisers. 162 Indeed, from the mid1990s, the Court has increased protection for other advertisers,
including liquor advertisers, 163 gambling advertisers,164 and tobacco
advertisers.165 Attorney advertisers, however, remained strangely left
behind–at least in some jurisdictions. First Amendment expert Rod
Smolla explained this phenomenon in poignant language: “If
commercial advertisers are First Amendment step-children, lawyers
come closer to abandoned orphans.”166
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON ATTORNEY ADVERTISERS IN THE S TATES
At least some states certainly appear to treat attorney advertisers
like “abandoned orphans.”167 These states impose a variety of
restrictions on attorney advertisers. Some of the restrictions involve
state rules of professional conduct that provide an exhaustive list of
what constitutes “false and misleading” communications to clients.
For example, South Dakota lists 17 examples of “false and
misleading” communications.168
These include limitations on
comparisons with other lawyers, testimonials, dramatizations, and the
catch-all category of “any other material statement or claim that cannot
162. As one astute legal commentator points out, three of the dissenters in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. were Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Stevens. See
Melissa K. Feliciano, THE MARYLAND SURVEY: 1996-1997: Recent Decisions:
The Maryland Court of Appeals, 57 MD. L. REV. 659, 671 (1997). They joined the
plurality opinion in a case the next year, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484 (1996), that provided greater protection for commercial speech. See
Feliciano, supra, at 669; see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Attorney Ads, NEWSEUM
INSTITUTE
(Dec. 2008), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-amendmentcenter/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/advertising-first-amendment-overview/attorneyads/ (“Ironically, the Went For It decision and other regulations on attorney speech
have occurred during a time when the U.S. Supreme Court has more searchingly
scrutinized restrictions on commercial speech in general.”).
163. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. 484.
164. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999).
165. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
166. Rodney M. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 4
(2002).
167. Id.
168. S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(c).
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be factually substantiated.”169 Florida prohibits attorney ads that are
“unduly manipulative or intrusive.” 170 Arkansas flatly prohibits
lawyers from using testimonials or endorsements as ads.171 Ohio
prohibits lawyers from advertising legal fees with the terms “cut-rate,”
“lowest,” “give-away,” “low-cost,” or “special.”172 North Carolina has
extensive disclaimer requirements for dramatizations. 173 Colorado
requires lawyers to use only regular U.S. mail when sending
unsolicited communications to persons. 174 Alabama has a special rule
on the professional cards of non-lawyers.175
Some state court decisions regarding attorney advertising are
hard to justify. For example, in N.C. State Bar v. Culbertson, the Court
of Appeals of North Carolina admonished a lawyer for including on
his letterhead and on his website that he was “Published in Federal
Reports, 3d Series.”176 The attorney indeed was an attorney of record
in a federal case that was printed in the Federal Reporter. 177 This was
truthful information. However, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
reasoned that “[a] member of the general public could easily be led to
believe from defendant’s assertions on his firm letterhead and website
that he authored the opinion contained in the Federal Reporter.”178 The
decision relies on a very paternalistic assumption about the lack of
knowledge of the general public. The result in Culbertson borders on
the absurd. The Florida Supreme Court approved of the imposition of
public discipline upon attorneys who advertised themselves with a
“pitbull” logo and used as their phone number “1-800-PITBULL.”179
The Court wrote that the attorneys had used a “sensationalistic image
and a slogan.”180 The Court explained:

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(c)(5), (14)–(15), (17).
FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.
ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(d).
OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1, cmt. 4.
N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(b).
COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(c).
ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.6.
627 S.E.2d 644, 646 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 649.
Id.
Fla. Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240, 241–42 (Fla. 2005).
Id. at 243.
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The logo of the pit bull wearing a spiked collar and the
prominent display of the phone number 1-800-PITBULL are more manipulative and misleading than a
drawing of a fist. These advertising devices would
suggest to many persons not only that the lawyers can
achieve results but also that they engage in a combative
style of advocacy. The suggestion is inherently
deceptive because there is no way to measure whether
the attorneys in fact conduct themselves like pit bulls so
as to ascertain whether this logo and phone number
convey accurate information. 181
The Court went so far as to write that “permitting this type of
advertisement would make a mockery of our dedication to promoting
public trust and confidence in our system of justice.” 182
The attorneys filed a petition for Supreme Court review,
arguing that the ban on the pitbull advertising violated the First
Amendment because it was demeaning and created an “amorphous and
standardless judgment.”183 The petition stated that, “under our First
Amendment principles, even when discounted by the reduced
standards applicable to commercial speech, we assign the management
of good taste to the forces of the marketplace, not the forces of
government.”184 The High Court, however, denied review. 185
In a disturbing trend, more and more states have engaged in
“greater micromanagement of on-line advertising.”186 For example,
the New York County Lawyers Association Professional Ethics
Committee issued an opinion that warned lawyers about making false

181. Id. at 244.
182. Id. at 246.
183. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Pape v. Fla. Bar, 918 So. 2d 240 (Fla.
2005) (No. 05-1046).
184. Id. at 5.
185. Pape, 918 So. 2d at 240, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1632 (2006).
186. ASS’N OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, 2015 REPORT OF THE
REGULATION OF LAWYER ADVERTISING COMMITTEE 22 (2015) [hereinafter APRL
REPORT],
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsi
bility/aprl_june_22_2015%20report.authcheckdam.pdf.
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or misleading statements on their LinkedIn profiles, even those
submitted by other endorsers or reviewers. 187
The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer’s blog about
his cases could be subject to the state’s advertising rules. The criminal
defense attorney blogged about many of his cases, including the results
he achieved. 188 Even though his blogs contained political commentary,
the Virginia high court determined that the lawyer’s blog was a form
of commercial speech subject to the advertising rules. 189 “Hunter has
admitted that his motivation for the blog is at least in part economic,”
the court found.190 “The posts are an advertisement in that they
predominately describe cases where he has received a favorable result
for his client.”191
In dissent, Judge Donald Lemon recognized that speech about
the criminal justice system is political speech: “Speech concerning the
criminal justice system has always been viewed as political speech.” 192
He also pointed out that “[m]arketing is not Hunter’s sole motivation
for maintaining this blog. As discussed above, one of Hunter’s
motivations in maintaining the blog is to disseminate information
about ‘the criminal justice system, the criminal trials and the manner
in which the government prosecutes its citizens.’” 193
First Amendment expert Clay Calvert said, “[t]he decision
could have a chilling effect on the speech of some of the most informed
people in the United States when it comes to problems with the
criminal justice system—namely, the attorneys who deal with it on a
daily basis.”194 The attorney petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court,
contending that “[s]peech concerning the judicial system is

187. See generally N.Y.C. Lawyers Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op.
748 (2015), http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/connected%20lawyer%20opinion.pdf.
188. Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 613
(Va. 2013).
189. Id. at 617.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 622 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 623.
194. David L. Hudson, Jr., Virginia Supreme Court Holds That Advertising
Rules May Be Applied to a Lawyer’s Blog, AM. B. ASS’N J. (Nov. 2013),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/virginia_supreme_court_holds_that_ad
vertising_rules_may_be_applied_to_a_law.
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quintessentially ‘political speech’ falling squarely within the ambit of
the marketplace of ideas.”195 The U.S. Supreme Court denied review,
failing to provide needed guidance on when an attorney’s blog may be
considered commercial speech by bar regulators.196
A. A New Age for Attorney Advertisers?
There is a greater recognition in the last couple of years, at least
in certain quarters, that lawyers need more freedom in advertising and
that the current advertising restrictions are outdated. In 2015, the
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers’ Regulation of
Lawyer Advertising Committee issued a report that called for a
comprehensive overhaul of the current rules. 197
The APRL Report stated that the rules in most jurisdictions are
“outdated and unworkable in the current legal environment and fail to
achieve their stated objectives.”198 Many of the current rules are based
on lawyer ads in print and other traditional forms of advertising, such
as business cards or mailers.199 These rules are becoming increasingly
outdated, as more and more lawyers are advertising on social media. 200
The APRL Report gave the informative example of a lawyer not being
able to use Twitter in Florida because the lawyer would not have
sufficient space to include a required disclaimer.201 The trend of overregulating attorney speech on the Internet is disturbing, because
Internet-based advertising is “accepted practice” and the most common
195. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 695.
196. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 611, cert. denied, 570 U.S. 919 (2013).
197. See generally APRL REPORT, supra note 186.
198. Id. at 3.
199. Id. at 20 (“State rules on lawyer advertising are largely based on print and
other forms of traditional advertising such as announcements, business cards, mailers,
newsletters, yellow pages, billboards, television and radio ads, newspaper
advertisements, and listings in Martindale Hubbell or other print directories.”).
200. See generally ATTORNEY AT WORK, 2017 SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETING
SURVEY
REPORT
(2017),
https://www.attorneyatwork.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/2017-Social-Media-Marketing-Survey-Report-@AttorneyatWork.pdf.
201. See APRL REPORT, supra note 186, at 21 (quoting David L. Hudson, Jr.,
Firm Challenges Florida Bar Over Website Ad Limits, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/firm_challenges_florida_bar_over_we
bsite_ad_limits/).
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way that the public receives and tries to discover legal information and
legal services. 202
“The APRL report acknowledges what all of us know—that,
with the growth of technology, American consumers now have access
to a vast potpourri of information about lawyers,” committee member
Bruce E.H. Johnson told the ABA Journal.203 “As a consequence,
many old-fashioned restrictions governing the dissemination of
information about legal services have become outmoded and, to the
extent that they inhibit information that is neither false nor misleading,
potentially dangerous to free speech rights.”204 The Committee did not
call for an abdication of regulators’ authority over legal advertising. 205
Instead, the Committee explained that it advocated that the states
create a “single rule” against lawyers engaging in “false or misleading
advertising.”206
The basis behind the APRL Report is the idea that rules
governing attorney ads should not hamper attorneys’ ability to
communicate truthful information to would-be legal consumers. The
APRL Report explains that “[r]estrictions on accurate information
about legal service, imposed by competing law firms that function as
part of the regulatory governing body, restrain trade and hinders the
public’s access to useful information.” 207 The effect of some of these
overly broad advertising restrictions is that it chills attorneys from
communicating to members of the public in the way that most
members of the public generally communicate. 208

202. Mark L. Tuft, Rethinking Lawyer Advertising Rules, 23 THE
PROFESSIONAL
LAWYER
1,
1
(2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/professional_lawyer/vol
ume_23_number_3/ABA_PLN_v023n03_01_rethinking_lawyer_advertising_rules.
authcheckdam.pdf.
203. David L. Hudson, Jr., Drastic Change Needed in “Outdated and
Unworkable” Lawyer Advertising Rules, Says Report, AM. B. ASS’N J. (Oct. 2015)
[hereinafter
Hudson,
Drastic
Change],
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/all_aboard_for_streamlining.
204. Id.
205. APRL REPORT, supra note 186, at 4.
206. Id. at 3.
207. Id. at 26.
208. Id. at 27; see also Ronald G. Rotunda, Regulating Attorney Advertising
When It Is Not Misleading, VERDICT JUSTIA (Oct. 12, 2015),
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The APRL Report also revealed some other illuminating
findings, including that complaints about advertising are rare, that
those who complain about lawyer advertisements are usually other
lawyers, few states actively monitor lawyer ads, and much disciplined
conduct could have been disciplinable under the catch-all rule
8.4(c).209 The APRL Report concludes that “[a] simple ‘false or
misleading’ standard for lawyer communications about legal services
best balances the important interests of access to justice, protection of
the public and clients, integrity of the legal profession, and the uniform
regulation of lawyer conduct.”210 This proposal, according to the
APRL Report, is “the best way to ensure honest communication by
lawyers while at the same time promoting the widest possible access
by the public to legal services.” 211
“Our empirical study showed that the problem is not how the
lawyer designates himself or herself as an admiralty lawyer, or whether
the lawyer uses email or text messages,” ethics and constitutional law
expert Ronald Rotunda, who served on the committee that drafted the
APRL Report, told the ABA Journal.212 “To the extent there is any
problem, it has to do with misleading speech. If the disciplinary
authorities focused their limited resources in that area, clients would
be better off.”213
The APRL Report calls for a “common sense response” to
regulating lawyer ads.214 It says that lawyer ad rules should be uniform
rather than a hodge-podge of different state rules. 215 Further, it states
that “[l]awyers should not be subject to discipline for ‘potentially
misleading’ advertisements or advertisements that a regulator thinks
are distasteful or unprofessional.” 216

https://verdict.justia.com/2015/10/12/regulating-lawyer-advertising-when-it-is-notmisleading.
209. APRL REPORT, supra note 186, at 28.
210. Id. at 30.
211. Id. at 32.
212. Hudson, Drastic Change, supra note 203.
213. Id.
214. APRL REPORT, supra note 186, at 4.
215. Id. at 29.
216. Id.
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B. Latest ABA Draft Proposal of Rule 7
The ABA responded to the APRL Report by proposing changes
to Model Rule 7 that incorporate at least one major theme of the
report—focusing, as the primary area of emphasis, on the “false and
misleading” prohibition of Rule 7.1.217 Under the new draft version of
Rule 7, the currently published Rule 7.5, Firm Names and Letterheads,
is deleted.218 Much of what was Model Rule 7.5 becomes Comments
4 through 8 of Model Rule 7.1, the main rule against “false or
misleading” communications.219
Model Rule 7.3, Solicitation of Clients, is modified to allow
lawyers to solicit not only other lawyers, family members, or close
friends, but also “a person who is known by the lawyer to be an
experienced user of the type of legal services involved for business
matters.”220 Proposed Comment 2 to Rule 7.3 reflects a recognition of
new technologies in lawyer advertising by defining “live person to
person contact” to mean “in person, face to face, telephone, and realtime person to person communications such as Skype or Facetime, and
other visual/auditory communications where the prospective client
may feel obligated to speak with the lawyer.”221
The net effect is that the APRL Report and, at least to some
degree, the proposed changes to ABA Model Rule 7 reflect a need to
update the rules from a technological standpoint. Hopefully, when
state regulators of attorney advertisers police the bar for allegedly false
and misleading communications, they remember the value of attorney
advertising to the public.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that many attorney ads exhibit questionable
taste. Some are downright offensive, silly, or strange. The image of

217. Id. at 4.
218. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Working
Draft
December
21,
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsi
bility/scepr_advertising_rules_draft_12_21_17.authcheckdam.pdf.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.

2018

Attorney Advertising in The Litigators

985

the ambulance-chasing lawyer that John Grisham depicted so
humorously in The Litigators is not likely to go away anytime soon.
The Wally Figgs of the world will continue to cross ethical boundaries
in pursuit of clients, though they probably will do so in more
technologically advanced ways. While Wally did not advertise online,
he certainly tried just about everything else. Grisham captured the
essence of the overzealous lawyer acting more as a huckster than as a
learned professional.222
What should never be forgotten, however, is that lawyer
advertising serves a high purpose: to inform consumers or prospective
clients of their legal rights. Furthermore, the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution protects most lawyer advertising. In a freemarket economy in a society devoted to the marketplace of ideas, it
makes little sense to stem the free flow of commercial information—
even if it involves tasteless or offensive speech. The APRL Report
recognizes the benefits of attorney advertising and hopefully will lead
to a better system—one in which the morality police do not sanction
lawyers for offensive or tasteless speech but focus on ads that are truly
false or misleading.

222.

See generally GRISHAM, supra note 14.

